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Inventing a Sociology of Technology
Cornelis Disco
Introduction
One of the great lapses of the sociological imagination has surely been an ap-
preciation of the role of technology in society. The “founding fathers” – if we
may except Marx – paid it scant attention, and their intellectual descendents
have done little better. Mark Shields says:
The vital sociological traditions of theorising about phenomena such as
the state, power, social class, ideology, division of labour, religion, revo-
lution ... have barely touched technology. This is a stunning omission.
Shields , )
What is stunning is of course the lack of interest in a phenomenon which by all
accounts has been one of the prime levers of change in modern societies. The
classical mission of sociology, to offer a new reflexive self-understanding for
post-feudal, industrial societies, would seem to encourage sociologists to po-
sition the study of technology at the very centre of their intellectual pro-
gramme. Instead, they have marginalised and disdained technology, treating
it as a trivial corollary of economic or scientific rationality,and of sociological
relevance only insofar as it had effects on other societal patterns (Ogburn
; Gouldner and Peterson ). Technology has been taken seriously as a
sociological phenomenon itself by only a very few sociologists (Gilfillan ;
Noble ). For the most part, it has been left to renegade traditions like
Marxism and labour-process theory (MacKenzie ), recently reinforced by
the new social studies of technology () to unpack the “black box” of tech-
nology and reposition it as an authentic societal phenomenon. However,
these traditions have adopted more or less sectarian standpoints with respect
to mainstream sociology and have reinforced, rather than weakened, socio-
logical prejudices regarding the ontological and epistemological “otherness”
of technology.
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This is not the place to dwell on the many reasons for the suppression of
technology in the sociological project. What we can do here is examine how,
given the nature of technology and the deep structure of academic sociology,
technology might be incorporated into the sociological program in a way
commensurate with its societal importance.
As to the nature of technology, it is now clear that it is far from the straight-
forward means (or set of tools) that sociologists have generally taken it to be.
We shall have occasion to dwell on this point in connection with four “tech-
nological parables”in the following section.As to the “deep structure”of soci-
ology, I take that to refer to the essential opposition between (or dialectic of)
agency and structure which has been the primal matrix of social theory from
the times of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber on-
wards. In its classical form, this dialectic posits a mutually constitutive rela-
tionship between individual human beings (or social groups) and a larger so-
cial collectivity. It is a compact way of accounting for, on the one hand, social
order and stability (i.e., the Hobbesian problem of how numerous individu-
als, often at cross-purposes, can maintain stable patterns of interaction) and,
on the other, social change (how those stable patterns can evolve or even be
dramatically transformed). The scheme expresses a relation between situated
social action (agency) and an order of sedimented norms, role expectations,
laws and … technologies (structure). The relation is such that social action is
shaped and given meaning by these sedimented structures, but also that so-
cial action in turn impinges on social structure, either reinforcing it or caus-
ing it to change: i.e., to evoke new patterns of interaction and new sedi-
mentented structures.
Traditionally, this scheme has tended to apportion different types of enti-
ties to the poles of agency and structure, respectively. Humans, defined as
uniquely endowed with consciousness and intentionality, have been seen as
the primary, if not the only, sources of social agency. Non-human entities,
e.g., texts, beliefs, and material objects and systems, have been apportioned to
the sphere of structure. Technology thus becomes a feature of the sociological
landscape rather than an actor on the historical stage. The scheme has also
defined human beings as the sole makers of society. Bruno Latour has at-
tacked this “modernist purification” with vigour and imagination (Latour
,).For him and others, it has been sufficient reason to reject the soci-
ological tradition tout court and to turn to one other metaphysics of the so-
cial. One may ask to what extent this is necessary or helpful. This depends on
the answers to three additional questions: Is there good reason to challenge
the traditional attribution of entities to the categories of “agent” and “struc-
ture”? Would such a re-attribution violate the logic of the dialectic or impair
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its sociological work? Is the dialectic of agency and structure the right center-
piece for a science of society; i.e.,would the conceptual work of re-attribution
be worth it? Is sociology worth saving for technology? Given what the field of
Science and Technology Studies has revealed about technology over the past
thirty years, it is clear that the answer to the first question must be “yes”. The
“technology parables”to be presented below merely confirm this. I will argue
that the dialectic of agency and structure is not essentially implicated in any a
priori ontological distinction between humans and nonhumans. It can work
as a formal and methodological scheme quite apart from the contingent attri-
butions of types of entities to one or another of the poles. Finally, in regard to
the question of whether sociology is worth the effort of manipulating its
, I suggest it can be done; I also think it should be done, if only because so-
ciology’s foundational agency-structure dialectic is still the only approach
which incorporates elements of psychology, economics, and history into a
unified metaphysics of social action. Sociology provides the only potentially
unified approach to modernity as an achievement (or catastrophe) leaving
traces in time. It is worth having a world in which one can have one’s nonhu-
man actors and eat the cake of sociology, too.
Technologies
To address this issue, it will help to have a concrete image of what we are talk-
ing about. Following are four stories about material artifacts, i.e., constructs
intelligently designed to perform some specific function or task (whether or
not they are held to do so in practice).
Palm organizer
Imagine having your daily schedule, important phone numbers, lists,
meeting times and more in one organized place. It’s easy and more af-
fordable than ever with the Palm™ IIIe handheld.
–  advertisement for Palm. (www.palm.com)
Up front, advertisements for electronic organisers like the Palm series pro-
duced by com Inc. portray the new gadgets as productivity enhancers, as
tools for organising fragmented lives. The Palm lets us apportion our time in
advance. Its literal electronic memory “backs up” our own spotty faculties
and infallibly reminds us of what we are to do and when we are to do it.At the
same time, the volatility of electronic memory, the ease with which informa-
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tion can be erased,edited,and replaced makes it a highly flexible tool for time,
task, and contact management.
Palm Inc. maintains a website including, among other things, a collection
of customer testimonials. These reveal that Palm organizers enhance the ca-
pabilities of users, but also change their relationships to themselves and oth-
ers. The testimonial writers invariably experience this as a positive change
and consequently tend to fawn over their new “digital pals”.
 
I am a female sales professional working - hours while at the same
time trying to manage a home,  small children, a marriage, etc. I live to
be organised but sometimes have trouble keeping it all together.
I ...charged it and began to enter data.Within hours, I had entered my
year  appointments, approximately  important dates (birthdays,
etc), my children’s school calendars, before- and after-school activities,
not to mention several customised “to do”lists (daily, weekly, monthly,
annually, biannually, etc). Needless to say, I have fallen in love with it...
Thank you, Palm Computing, for making organisation so much fun!!! 
 
I work in the internet financial services industry and as such have to
manage multiple and diverse projects, initiatives and issues. I am always
on the move, in meetings or visiting outside the bank. Information is
critical to ensure that details are not missed and that I can speak intelli-
gently about the issues. There is invariably insufficient time to prepare,
so having the information at my finger tips just as I last saw it on my lap-
top is absolutely critical for me.
Here is why my Palm V organiser is now a critical part of my life.
 It fits in my pocket... I always have it with me.
 Easy-Sync: I HotSync with Lotus Notes  and individuals across the
Bank can view my schedule. I have a custom folder in Notes where my
daily news from Slate and  are placed by a Lotus Notes “rule”. I then
HotSync that folder with the Palm V organiser and can read those news
emails on the Palm V organiser on the subway.
 Inforover: I read news from Associated Press daily as well as the  web-
site so always up to date on news.About  – K daily download.
 Project@Hand: All our projects recorded in Project  are HotSync’d on
my Palm V organiser so in meetings I am always prepared with the full
details.
 Thoughtmill: I use this for capturing thoughts and ideas for future refer-
ence.Very cool outliner.
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 UltraMoney: Lastly I am so busy I never remember to balance my bank
account, so now I view my bank statement in the Palm V organiser which
comes from the internet via  Money .
These are paeons of praise in a utilitarian mode. However, they contain sub-
texts which delineate some of the ironies attached to inviting a machine in to
help organise (run?) your life. One of these ironies is the question of who (or
what?) is organising what (or whom?). For example, what kind of self-disci-
pline is involved in using a Palm as a tool and what is it like living with the
tyranny of infallible and literal memory? Who may co-opt this memory in or-
der to discipline the user across spans of space and time?
User , for example, begins with standard praise for the Palm as a “produc-
tivity tool”. However, the subsequent description of the Palm-in-use as a
“critical part of my life” makes us wonder what kind of tool this is. It seems
that in order to use it in the volatile context of the financial services industry,
user  must subject himself to a strict daily regimen of data gathering and di-
gesting. Given how much of his workaday efficacy is delegated to the Palm,
anything less amounts to functional failure of user  in his business context.
User ’s subtext contrasts with the paeon to efficiency in the main text; it is ac-
tually a confession of subjection to the device. Perhaps this is not adequately
put. The point is that the Palm organizer enables user  to arm and discipline
himself in accord with his employer’s needs. The impression is not that user 
thus “wins time”for himself but rather that, thanks to the pervasive role of the
Palm in his life, user  is able to mould himself into a more perfect employee
of the bank (and hence,presumably,advance his career).The Palm thus effec-
tively becomes a personalised tool for translating the demands of employ-
ment into a self-imposed regime. But then whose tool is it, and what exactly is
the status of a human actor “armed” with a Palm or, perhaps, “chained” to a
Palm and subject to its tyranny of perfect memory?
This simultaneous exercise of self-discipline and other-discipline by
means of the Palm also extends to private and romantic matters, as the fol-
lowing citation suggests.
 
I’ve just received a Palm ™ connected organiser as a Christmas gift
from my husband and I must say I am in love... Not only have I dumped
every contact name I have into to this sexy device, but the design of this
device fits my hand like a new friend.
Although my husband does not mind my new found love affair, he has
insisted that I pre-schedule time with him and is quite pleased with him-
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self over the control it provides him to gain access to my schedule. He has
even pre-programmed a year’s worth of scheduled “dates”and set up the
beeping mode, so I won’t forget.What a sweetie, xxoo.
PS: He doesn’t know a thing about computers, so he must have worked
late into the night to figure out how to enter in all the information and
get it to work.
Great work in the design and layout.All I can say is ooh-la-la.
In this three-player figuration (user , her husband, and the Palm) the Palm
mediates the availability of user ’s time. In particular, the husband has co-
opted the Palm to stake romantic claims to his wife’s “schedule”, claims which
user  coyly allows the Palm to register and which she suggests she will honor.
But explicit sex seems reserved for the Palm itself. User  claims to be “in love”.
But is she in love with her husband for giving her the Palm or in love with the
Palm? The husband is “a sweetie”, but the Palm is “sexy”, it is “a new friend”,
and all user  can say is “ooh-la-la”. Is user  simply the Emma Bovary of the
informatics era, or does she constitute a new exotic-erotic kind of cyborg to-
gether with her Palm? Is the nature of the Palm, its “features”and “design”, re-
sponsible for this romantic drama? 
What do we learn from this? In the first place, that we need to take a second
look at the facile ontological division between humans and “things”. This
does not mean throwing it overboard without further ado.The Palm testimo-
nials suggest that it is often difficult to decide who (or what) is programming
whom (or what).The human agent disciplines the Palm to provide certain in-
formation on call, but the Palm subsequently turns around and disciplines
the human.
What can we mean when we say the Palm “disciplines” the human? It is a
simple enough matter to assert that the Palm is an “agent”and thus “acts”, but
what does this mean sociologically speaking? Few would be prepared to en-
dow the Palm with the same quality of sentience and reflexivity as ourselves,
so that its “acting”must be of a different order. It is clear that a Palm devoid of
a human is meaningless; it is simply an orderly configuration of elements
with particular performative potentials. This does not hold for the inverse,
i.e., a human without a Palm – however much Palm Inc. may try to convince
us otherwise. So – as long as the device is working to rule – agency can be attrib-
uted to the Palm only in a derivative and ironic sense. The Palm acts on its hu-
man operator,but only by a kind of blanket permission,on the basis of a prior
compact by which the human sets the Palm up to exert discipline over him- or
herself at some future time. The agency of the Palm thus derives from the vol-
untary submission of the human to demands made by a past self on a future
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self. The Palm’s infallible memory becomes an instrument for storing de-
mands on and information relevant for the future self. Like Marx’s worker,
the human actor is confronted by a temporarily alienated form of his own in-
tentionality locked up in the microcircuits of the Palm. Could this be the
(narcissistic) secret of the Palm’s erotics? Inasmuch as the future is unpre-
dictable, the moment at which the Palm presents its alienated demands may
be totally inappropriate and may conflate past and present in odd ways. This
amplifies the illusion of the Palm’s own agency. The Palm cannot of course do
more, nor less, than it is instructed to do, but the precise circumstances in
which it does what it must can change the original meaning of the informa-
tion entered in the past. In this sense the “detour” of the Palm has introduced
an element of creative novelty into the ongoing self-organisation of the hu-
man. The Palm as partner in the reflexive self-discipline of ongoing life trans-
forms the human actor into an informationally competent and punctual ac-
tor – but also an actor set up to be invaded at times by his own past intentions.
This actor is a hybrid actor, a human-with-Palm, a “palmed Human”.
We must conclude that the issue is not so much whether humans or
“things”have agency,but that the agency of humans and things, such as it is, is
modified by the “hybridisation” of agents in the form of humans-with-tools.
In more general terms, human agency is so transformed by the technologies
involved in the constitution of that agency, that in a technological age it does
not make sense anymore to speak of human actors apart from their techno-
logical accoutrements. Unlike a rose, a Palm user is not a car driver is not, as
we shall see, a designer of superconducting solenoid magnets.
Designing magnets for the G-2 experiment 
Experiments in high-energy physics are organised as collaborative efforts
among a number of locally based physics groups. Typically, the collaboration
is sited at one of the large particle accelerators, and participating physicists fly
in to attend meetings and participate in the ongoing work. To perform their
experiments, the collaborators must first design and construct a “detector”.
These detectors transform the streams of high-energy particles produced by
the accelerators into “events”that physicists can study. Detectors are typically
large and complex devices, taking many years to design and construct. This
process, even though the setting is exotic, is typical of design processes in gen-
eral and reveals a basic feature of technology, namely that it is purposively
constructed in order to perform a particular function. This does not rule out
that designers may disagree on the function to be performed and especially
on the way to implement the desired function in a design.
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The following account of the design of a component of a high-energy
physics detector shows both the purposiveness and the contentiousness of
the design process. The component in question is a m diameter supercon-
ducting magnet ring for the Muon g- experiment which has been on-line at
Brookhaven National Laboratories at Upton, New York, since  (Disco
). The purpose of the experiment is to measure the so-called “anomalous
magnetic moment”of a particle called the muon to a hitherto unprecedented
degree of precision. This requires an extremely strong and very precise and
uniform magnetic field along the entire length of the  m-diameter coil. This
was terra incognita for magnet designers and in fact proved to be a formidable
engineering challenge.
It took only a few meetings of the magnet coil group to discover that there
were serious disagreements on at least four aspects of the coil design. The
minutes of Feb. , , indicate that for each aspect, two main options were
under discussion.
 Winding configuration:“pancake”vs.“continuous”or “zig-zag”.
 Material for the coil mandrels (supports): aluminum vs. stainless steel.
 Winding technique:“ferris”vs. horizontal.
 Method of coil-cooling: Epoxied package in contact with liquid He cool-
ing tubes vs. Immersion of coil package in liquid He cryostat.
Not all combinations were being pursued, so that in practice only two or
three coherent “designs” were actually circulating – each championed by one
of the participating groups. In the coil-group minutes, several of the alterna-
tives were evaluated as follows:
 needs more delicate filling of voids;  needs welding of the alu-
minum coverplate, very risky;  needs tall building;  allows extru-
sion of the aluminum profile, cooling tube for liquid helium included.
In the Feb. ,  meeting, for example, the issue of mandrel material was
discussed. RS (a Brookhaven physicist) argued for stainless steel because “the
pitfalls are best known”. This provoked , the  physicist chairing the
group – and also writing up the minutes – to the following encomium on alu-
minum:
This does not rule out aluminum cryostats! Any proposition, reasonably
worked out, will be thoroughly discussed, since we are all aware that alu-
minum allows extrusion, incorporation of helium cooling duct, vastly
superior heat conduction and absence of magnetic disturbance.
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On March , there was a joint meeting of the three groups then working on
different aspects of the detector design. The chief engineer of the coils group
reported as follows:
The group struggles with the material for the helium vessel: stainless
steel or aluminum... stainless steel is more conservative, but the extreme
slenderness of the coil section with respect to the coil radius made us
look for other material combinations in which an aluminum tank or
aluminum strips wound together with the conductor are possible alter-
natives. The conductor fabrication is under control. The leads are, as al-
ways, difficult to realise, in particular for the outer coils, where they have
to pass through the back leg of the magnet. The coil winding is still under
discussion. The coil support is tricky because of tight space, large forces,
and low heat loss.
The battle over winding methods was particularly fierce. On April , ,
the chief mechanical engineer of the Yale group published a memo on “Evalu-
ation of Superconducting Coil Concepts” again advocating “continuous
winding”as opposed to so-called “pancake winding”:
We find that during several meetings of this subgroup the general ten-
dency was mostly in the direction of pancake coil construction.As a mat-
ter of fact, continuous winding coils were not seriously considered, and
the strongest argument was that pancake was “the way it was always
done”. (Disco )
In the event, the entire controversy was settled several months later by the in-
tervention of a group from the Japanese national accelerator facility KEK.
This group had a novel idea – already implemented in smaller magnets – for
winding the coils “inside-out”, i.e., from the mandrel inwards. Moreover, the
group had a generous budget and offered to supply a quantity of “spare”
superconductor material. Within a month, the virtues of the  design had
dissolved resistance in the coil group, and it had become the preferred design
for the coil configuration and winding method.Although its implementation
was still far from routine, the design was sufficiently coherent to resolve the
other bones of contention which had paralysed the group until then.
This “design parable”differs from the first one about the Palm organiser. It
shows another, but equally fundamental,“phase state”of technologies.While
the parable of the Palm showed technology as a device-in-use, modulating
agency and social order in a wide range of social settings, the parable of the
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muon g- coils shows technology in the laboratory, as a device-in-the-mak-
ing: an as-yet-uncertain crystallisation of social purposes in a material con-
figuration. Several points should be emphasised:
 The design process is an effort to define and master the future behaviour of
an artifact. We should add: not only its manifest and desired properties, as in
the g- example, but also its intended and unintended side-effects, dangers,
and risks. Hence, understanding what goes on in the design process is a pre-
requisite for understanding the potentials of the artifacts that come out of it,
or are likely to come out of it – although it is unlikely to be enough to predict
the exact ways an artifact will turn out, i.e., its (quite possibly ambiguous)
“societal career”.
 Artifacts are designed to function in stable and predictable ways. This en-
courages the use of non-living elements insofar as these are generally more
stable and predictable – though often less flexible – than living elements like
animals or humans. Superior stability and predictability are reasons why in
advanced societies so much of human agency is “delegated”to machines (La-
tour ).Artifacts become important material anchors for social action, re-
placing older forms of co-ordination and socialisation. In high-energy
physics with its demands for superhuman performances, such delegation is
absolutely necessary – humans simply can’t do the job – but the stability re-
quirements are at least as critical.As the chief engineer of the coil group noted
in a review:
The stability is a big problem: mounting concentric at room tempera-
ture, expecting it to be concentric at cryo-temp and last but not least
cope with the expansion when the current is ramped up, while the outer
coil is intrinsically unstable – all this demands superior engineering.
 Designers conceive of the artifact to be made as an actor.As they work, they
are constantly trying to predict how the structure they are trying build will be-
have given particular arrangements and ambient conditions (Bucciarelli
). They do this on the basis of what they know about similar structures in
similar situations as for example in the following commentary: “ points
out that the helical winding method leaves voids which are alternately on top
or on bottom of the coil, but the magnetic forces tend to push them all to one
side, hence half the layers may slip when the coils are energised” (minutes
March ). Some options seem beyond the cognitive pale. Then recourse is
had to measurements, models, prototypes and calculations to acquire insight
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into expected behaviours. For example, the minutes of the coil group contain
the following exchange.A physicist  is cited as predicting that“permeability
variations in the stainless steel weld could be swamped by a strip of high per-
meability material”.This prediction is qualified by the writer of the minutes as
“a statement clearly in need of quantification and research on adverse effects”.
The discourse of behaviours of these material structures is not of course a
discourse of motives, intentions,and strategies such as would be the case were
a political coalition the object of design. Here, and characteristic of techno-
logical design in general, the discourse of behaviours is of behaviours as gov-
erned by what, for lack of a better term, we call “natural law”. Let us define this
as the set of well-tested propositions and theories about how material objects
behave under specified conditions. Canonical formulations of “natural law”
(what we know about nature) are the substance of the textbooks of the natu-
ral and engineering sciences. The interesting property of natural law from the
perspective of design is that it in theory allows for determinate predictions
about the behaviour of material structures. Of course, this is only in theory.
In practice, as the deliberations of the coil group make clear, there is always
insufficient knowledge and insight, both into the properties of the structures
one is building with and into the prevailing conditions they will encounter.
These conditions are in part also subject to “natural law”, but in the final
analysis they also include an encounter with society, with human organisa-
tions and purposes. In the case of the g- experiment, this is the encounter of
the detector with the standards of evidence prevailing in the high-energy
physics community (Knorr-Cetina ). Are the magnets sufficiently stable
and uniform to warrant confidence in the data and the conclusions they have
helped to produce and which they tacitly underwrite? For other design proj-
ects like microwave ovens (Cockburn and Ormrod ), diesel engines
(Hård and Knie ), or storm-surge barriers (Disco ), this encounter
occurs elsewhere and in different contexts, but inevitably it does occur.
In this view, design is nothing more nor less than a process of incorporat-
ing nature into society. The result is neither the one (classical Nature) nor the
other (classical Durkheimian society as “moral order”) but a thoroughly hy-
brid sociotechnical order in which machines, tools and devices co-act with
humans. What these artifacts do, and can do, and what humans do, and can
do, are profoundly altered by the new hybrid juxtapositions – by technology-
in-society. This is why design engineering is not enough, but also why classi-
cal sociology is not enough.
 Although not highly visible in the g- account itself, this hybridisation of
actors and agency occurs not only in contexts of use, as in the Palm parable,
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but also in contexts of design. Indeed, how could it be otherwise, since design
contexts are also contexts of use, albeit not of end-products, but of testing de-
vices, prototypes, materials? The point is that design (and certainly design in
an esoteric field like high-energy physics) is itself accomplished by hybrid ac-
tors. Physicists and engineers would be powerless without an elaborate array
of measurement and test devices which enable them to assess the conse-
quences of different design decisions prior to committing significant re-
sources of time and money.
Human calculators
... I shall give a brief excerpt from the memoirs of an early member of the
 Mathematical Tables Project in New York City. This project was es-
tablished in  with a very small number of mathematicians and a fair-
ly large number of people from the relief rolls of the Depression. The
people who came from the relief rolls were a varied sort, and more than
rusty in their arithmetic. Therefore, they were divided into four different
groups. One group was to do addition, a second group to do subtraction,
a third to do multiplication, and the fourth group to do division and
check the results. The people were installed in an abandoned stable in
New York City, and the four groups were seated facing the four walls of
the room. Each group faced a wall on which there was a large poster giv-
ing them their most important instructions, and to keep negative num-
bers straight, each person was given both black and red pencils to work
with. The poster giving instructions for the addition group said:
Black plus black makes black.
Red plus red makes red.
Black plus red or red plus black, hand the sheets to group . (Slutz ,
)
What is disturbing about the situation described in this citation? It is of
course the panoptical nightmare, the Orwellian dystopia of reducing human
beings to cogs in a machine. Humans here were operatives possessing frag-
ments of instrumental competence. The whole, the calculating machine
which they produced by their fragmented labours, had no meaning for them;
it added up only from the perspective of the expert masters.
The Mathematical Tables Project exhibited a shocking disregard for mod-
ernist distinctions between humans and machines. The project mobilised all
the usual Taylorist ploys in order to transform intransigent human workers
 Cornelis Disco
Inside the Politics of Technolo  24-06-2005  10:58  Pagina 40
into obedient functionaries. Skills were fragmented, categorised and appor-
tioned to different workers according to ability.Rules of procedure were thor-
oughly explicated and reinforced by texts and material cues and instruments.
Routing of work followed explicit instructions allowing the minimum possi-
ble of individual discretion:“Black plus red or red plus black: hand the sheets
to group ”.
Therefore, the question this example raises is  the following: How is the
Taylorised human-based calculating collective designed and operated by the
mathematicians of the  Mathematical Tables Project any different from,
say, the gear and relay-based desk calculator or the silicon-based modern dig-
ital computer? If there is no practical difference, what are the consequences
for the classical attribution of agency (morality) to humans and of mere me-
chanical functionality (instrumental means) to artifacts composed of non-
human components? To turn Primo Levi around: “What is an artifact?” Or
better perhaps:“What is an artifact made of?”
The physicists and engineers in the g- story seem to be busy designing an
artifact composed entirely of nonhuman components. In this design process,
humans (except, of course, the designers themselves) seem a long way off. But
ultimately they are there in the form of the physicists who are going to have to
get the detector to produce compelling data. The physical detector must be
designed to take its part in a “hybrid ensemble” (Callon and Law ) con-
sisting of the machine and the physicists and engineers who will ultimately
use it to produce data about the muon. In the context of high-energy physics,
where the always minute data traces are easily wiped out by systematic or
transient “noise” in the detector, operability means total transparency. Physi-
cists must know at all times what the precise condition of the detector is so
that they can distinguish data from noise (Knorr-Cetina ). This knowl-
edge is based both on a priori confidence in the stability and performance of
the machine and on real-time monitoring of its performance. Both modes of
confidence depend on crafty design. Hence, although the proximate design
labour described above concerns the construction of a nonhuman apparatus,
i.e., a machine in the classical sense, the mediate aim is a “hybrid collectif”
(Callon and Law ) involving both human and nonhuman components.
The notion of “hybrid collectif” suggests a spectrum ranging from arti-
facts with predominantly nonhuman components to artifacts with predomi-
nantly human components. The g- magnet coils are clearly very near the
purely nonhuman pole, and the  Mathematical Tables Project is very
near to the purely human component pole. However, just as the g- magnet
assembly-in-use will not be purely nonhuman, the human calculator is not
purely human. The human calculator is again a “hybrid collectif” consisting
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of human operatives and overseers, but also of a set of tools and props:
coloured pencils, paper, texts, chairs, tables, etc.
The sociological reflex encourages us to call the human calculator an or-
ganisation with strict rules, hierarchies and bureaucratic discipline. This is
because it appears to be an orderly and centrally disciplined arrangement of
human actors.What advantage is there in thinking of it as an artifact in a class
with the Palm organizer or the g- coils? Only this: it encourages us to look at
this organisation of humans and things as an instrument craftily designed to
perform specific functions in a stable and predictable manner. It is a well-or-
dered factory for the dependable production of correct answers to sums. So
the  human calculator is no less a piece of technology and as much of an
engineering achievement as the Palm or the g- coils. We might say that the
 human calculator could pass an ironic Turing Test for being a machine.
However, the process of designing with nonhuman components is a differ-
ent kettle of fish from designing with human components. This has to do
with how designers can impose stability and predictability on the different
kinds of entities.A first-order distinction would be to say that nonhuman en-
tities must be disciplined by means of Baconian ruses, i.e., by mobilising nat-
ural law, while human entities must be disciplined by Benthamite panopti-
cism, i.e., by surveillance and the judicious application of the carrot and the
stick. The point is that entities subject to natural law can be disciplined (made
stable and predictable) by embedding them in the right material configura-
tions – at least as far as our knowledge and insight reach. Human entities
must be convinced, cajoled, and coerced to impose self-discipline, inasmuch
as it is impossible to control or predict movements, let alone thoughts, in suf-
ficient detail to guarantee useful and predictable performances. As with Tay-
lor’s famous -dollar-a-day man, the human entity has to be made to want to
perform to rule. Engineers burdened with the design of large hybrid techno-
logical systems like urban water supplies and electricity systems are constant-
ly faced with the problem of having to convince users to behave according to
the dictates of the artifact-system as a whole.
The  Mathematical Tables Project shows that in a pragmatic sense,hu-
mans cannot simply be defined as agents. They can rather easily be made into
components of artifacts – as indeed the history of industrialisation amply at-
tests. These artifacts act, but not according to the will of the human compo-
nents, but – if all goes “well”– as projections of the interests of their designers
and masters.
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Enschede: the explosion of S.E. Fireworks 
On the afternoon of May , , a hot and sunny day, a series of explosions
ravaged the neighbourhood of Roombeek in the northern part of the Dutch
city of Enschede. The culprit was a fireworks storage and assembly facility
called S.E. Fireworks. A fire on the grounds had somehow ignited explosives
stored in a set of reinforced concrete bunkers; the ensuing blasts ripped the
bunkers apart, shelling the surrounding area with chunks of reinforced con-
crete and igniting countless secondary blazes. In the space of  minutes the
neighbourhood was reduced to smoldering ruins. Amazingly, only  people
were killed, though many more were injured. Property damage was extensive.
S.E. Firework’s highly visible and dramatic activity on that Saturday after-
noon stood in stark contrast to its prior “behaviour”. Somehow, the normal
peaceful routine had broken down, and what we might call a “catastrophic
deconstruction” of the facility and its immediate environment ensued. We
have come full circle from the Palm parable to consider another artifact-in-
use. But now, instead of an artifact working-to-rule, we have a disaster whose
short-term effects seem to have left little room for “user interpretations”.
What can this “accident”teach us about humans, nonhumans and the dialec-
tic of agency and structure; in short, about technology and sociology?
The leading question is whether we should see S.E.Fireworks as an agent or
as a structure and, ipso facto, whether we should see the disaster as an erup-
tion of agency or as a collapse of structure. Secondly, though primarily, we
should sort out what kind of agency/structure we are dealing with. Are we
talking about human organisation, about reflexive human agency, about a
technical system and its associated failure modes? In short, how ought we to
describe S.E. Fireworks, and how ought we to explain the explosion?
Let us start by noting that, until the moment of the explosions, the resi-
dents of Roombeek considered S.E. Fireworks as just another unremarkable
small-scale industrial facility on the edge of the local industrial park. Few
even knew that there were fireworks stored there. The municipality was of
course informed and exercised its statutory right to perform periodic inspec-
tions and to provide permits for what was most certainly – and certainly in
retrospect – a hazardous activity. It seems that to the extent Roombeek resi-
dents knew what was going on at S.E. Fireworks, their perceptions of fire-
works as harmless entertainment and their trust in the city to enforce the nec-
essary safety regulations suppressed any overt concerns. Testimony after the
explosion corroborates this.
What kind of entity was S.E. Fireworks before the explosions? It was clearly
what sociologists call an organisation, i.e., a structure of more or less well-de-
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fined role sets with incumbents more or less performing to rule (Crozier
). Presumably, there was more slippage in role performance in the rou-
tinised structure of S.E. Fireworks than in our earlier example of the panopti-
cal  Mathematical Tables Project, but in essence they were similar enti-
ties. On the other hand, S.E. Fireworks was also an “agent,” even in its pre-
disaster days. It was a legal entity one could call on the phone, make deals
with, inspect, grant permits, and assign responsibilities. It was a significant
player in the specialised custom-fireworks market. This double identity is
hardly surprising, in fact, it is inherent in being an agent, inasmuch as agency
(of whatever kind) presupposes a structured actor. The agent (or actor/ac-
tant) is always also a structure composed of sub-entities, and it is in fact by
dint of analysis of that structure that the potentials for agency may be as-
sessed. Classical psychoanalysis has exactly the same kind of deconstructive
ambition with regard to the structure of human agents – in effect, postulating
a structure of sub-agents like the id, ego, and superego that performs the ag-
gregate agency of the person.
This ambiguity about agency and structure is not a problem because it
does not compromise the agency-structure dialectic as an analytic scheme for
tying together order and change and past, present and future. Agency and
structure remain different although mutually constitutive aspects of entities.
The difference is simply a matter of different levels of analysis and aggrega-
tion. What is worrisome, however, is that sociologists persist in excluding
technology from this dialectic – especially considering the explosive potential
of some technology-rich organisations.
The mutual implication of agency and structure and the exclusion of tech-
nology from sociological accounts holds a fortiori for the explosions them-
selves. Again, at a certain level of analysis, for example if we are concerned
about the effects of the explosions on the physical, social, or political environ-
ment of S.E. Fireworks, we can black-box the structural complexities of the
facility and treat it as a singular agent – albeit an agent gone beserk. However,
if we are interested in the causes of the catastrophe, for example because we
want to assign responsibility in connection with political and legal claims,
then we shall have to unpack the structure of the facility (and perhaps the his-
tory of its facilitations by other actors). In particular, we shall have to focus on
the constitutive actors/actants whose orderly and ordinary interactions con-
stituted S.E. Fireworks as a (quasi)-stable enterprise. Clearly something out
of the ordinary must have triggered the catastrophic breakdown of structure
which transformed S.E. Fireworks into a raging monster. How do we go
about describing this deviation from normalcy and its catastrophic conse-
quences? Two hermetic idioms, “natural law” explanations and sociological
explanations, are at our disposal.
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Adherents of “natural law” would say that certain chemicals stored inside
of concrete bunkers and sea containers caught fire and that as a result an ex-
plosion ensued that caused large chunks of the bunkers and containers to
pepper the surrounding neighbourhood. Regarding this account we have, so-
ciologically speaking, very little to explain. We could elaborate our “natural
law” explanation, invoking chemical and physical theory to explain the caus-
es of the explosion and the pattern of destruction that ensued. The points of
departure are the physical properties of the materials, their disposition on
May , , and the presence of fire on the grounds of S.E. Fireworks.
A sociological explanation would argue that because certain employees
were not being alert (maybe because it was very warm weather), because the
company was forcing them to violate safety regulations or because the divi-
sion of labour was such as to encourage miscommunication and accidents, a
destructive explosion ensued. Here, we certainly have some sociological ex-
plaining to do. But we would miss the physical causalities involved in the ex-
plosion and hence, somehow lose the specific technological dimension of the
accident – except to note that the failure of human discipline was contingent-
ly attached to highly destructive natural forces.
In practice, we see both kinds of discourses being used to deconstruct or
“reconstruct” accidents like this. There is a well-developed discourse of tech-
nological risk which concentrates on the physical etiology (what sequence of
events must have taken place in order for such an accident to occur) and
which may point to human error as a contributory factor. There is also a dis-
course derived from organisational sociology which combines this approach
with a focus on the human and organisational sources of such accidents (Per-
row ). Here we can begin to see the humans and the non-living compo-
nents as part of a single sociotechnical gestalt – as a technological-organisa-
tional hybrid with an innate proclivity to malfunction which is almost as
“normal”as its proclivity to perform as planned. Diane Vaughan has demon-
strated the strength of this approach in her analysis of the Challenger Space
Shuttle explosion (Vaughan ). This is a promising avenue of approach
because it understands technology as nature-made-social, as immanently
composed of both non-living and human elements. It is a style of analysis
which points the way to understanding S.E. Fireworks not as an ontological
dichotomy, i.e., a physical structure on the one hand, and a human organisa-
tion on the other, but as a “hybrid artifact” consisting of patterned interac-
tions between both non-living and human elements. What we require in or-
der to analyse the explosion socio-technically is to be able to speak of non-
human elements-in-use. We may need to have recourse to naturalistic expla-
nations, but only as links in a chain of reasoning which inevitably also in-
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cludes human intentions and (dis)order. The work of Perrow et al. clearly
points to a sociology of technological culpability.
But if we want to speak of S.E. Fireworks as a latent agent that sprang into
action on May ,  (or for that matter, as an apparently stable structure
that deteriorated catastrophically on that date), then we still need to qualify
the notion of agency involved here. Except at a formal level, i.e., in regard to
the schemata of structuration referred to in the introduction, the agency of
non-humans has a different logic than the agency of humans. Callon and
Law, for example, argue for a differentiated notion of agency for different
kinds of what they call “hybrid collectifs”:
...translation does not have to take the form of language. For here is the
bias, the logocentric bias which runs everywhere through social theory.
The bias in favour of the speakable. ...Which is why, though we cannot,
to be sure, say very much about it, we do not wish to link a notion of
agency to linguistic re-presentation. For signification ... is more general
than talk. It comes in all kinds of forms.And some, though only some,
we can imagine. Others, no doubt, we will never know.Which means
that there are multiform kinds of agency: forms of agency that we can’t
imagine; forms of agency performed in patterns of translation that are
foreign to us; forms of agency that are, for instance, nonstrategic, distrib-
uted, and decentred. (Callon and Law , )
Though Callon and Law might well reject this solution, we have considered
the possibility of qualifying the agency of nonhumans as agency subject to
“natural law”, e.g., the laws of physics or chemistry. However, S.E. Fireworks
was not merely composed of nonhuman beings; it was a “hybrid collectif” in
which humans and nonhumans were intimately juxtaposed and mutually
transforming. Its agency was thus amenable only to explanations which
somehow combine “natural law”and classical sociological explanations. This
is the challenge, not only for scholars of technology, but also for commissions
investigating the “causes”of such disasters.
What is technology?
Our four parables have given us important insights into technology. These
can be summarised as follows:
 The user testimonials about Palm organizers question the simple notion of
the artifact-as-tool and hence of the actor as unproblematic tool-user. The
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simple notion of a tool is: an artifact that an intentional subject uses to get a
specific job done. There are several points that need elucidation: How must
the Palm be shaped and disciplined in order to use it? What self-discipline
must the subject impose on him or herself in order to be able to use the Palm
as a tool at all? How does the Palm discipline the thoughts and movements of
the user? In what sense do the user and the Palm compose a cyborg, i.e., in
what ways do the Palm and the human user become a single hybrid actor? 
 The high-energy physics story reminds us that technology is not only a set
of material structures that we live with and that transform us, but that they
are intelligently and purposively designed to perform particular functions
vis-à-vis agency and social order. This does not imply that the intended de-
sign completely maps the design in use. Maximising this mapping is a major
problem for designers, developers, and (sometimes, as in this case) users. The
design process is therefore contended and negotiated and thus constitutes an
authentic field for sociological study.
 Thestoryof the“humancalculators”,i.e.,humansorganisedanddisciplined
by means of panoptical and Taylorist methods to do calculations for making
mathematical referencetables,argues that thestuff of whichartifactsaremade
makes no principled difference to defining and using them as means – even if,
as in this case,that matter is human brains and bodies.The inverse point is that
the presence of human brains and bodies does not necessarily imply the pres-
ence of human subjectivity, e.g., free will, imagination, spontaneity, etc.
 The S.E. Fireworks story makes two new points and also recapitulates les-
sons from the other three stories. The new points are, first, that agents are also
structures and, symmetrically, structures are also agents.The distinction rests
on levels of analysis. Almost as a corollary, it follows that a breakdown of so-
cio-technical structure can be analysed as agency of the structure vis-à-vis its
context (of other structure). Points from the other stories are recapitulated as
follows:
– S.E. Fireworks, in both its stable and unstable manifestations, was a “hy-
brid collectif”just like the “cyborg”Palm+user.
– Like the  Mathematical Tables Project, S.E. Fireworks incorporated
human actors as stabilised (“translated”) entities of its process. These were
also implicated in the structural breakdown.
– S.E. Fireworks, like the muon g- coils and indeed artifacts in general, was a
constructed “hybrid collectif”for whose behaviour and misbehaviour the de-
signers and maintainers share responsibility.
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Conceiving a sociology of technology
How can this Protean phenomenon called technology be incorporated into
mainstream social theory? The field of Science and Technology Studies has by
and large set itself up as an alternative, rather than a corrective, to the classical
sociological canon. Symmetrically, there is still little interest within main-
stream social theory for the accomplishments of the new technology studies,
in spite of the evident impacts of new technologies.
There are a few ridge-riders, however, who are claiming that classical social
theory and technology studies have mirror-image strengths and weaknesses,
and would profit from a synthesis.Where classical social theory is able to con-
ceptualise large-scale changes in the historical landscape and has a vigorous
sense of structural constraint, technology studies seem limited to contingent
and local explanations of mere episodes. Conversely, where technology stud-
ies have developed subtle methods of understanding technologies, classical
social theory is still at sea when it comes to thinking about the technological
dimensions of social order and transformation. Hence, these authors argue,
there seems every reason to try to formulate some kind of synthesis not based
on an a priori rejection of classical sociology. We shall take a look at three of
these efforts.
The perspective of the user
Mark Shields argues that sociological efforts to comprehend technology – in-
cluding the new technology studies – are all in thrall to what he terms an “in-
strumentalist” conception of technology. “Instrumentalism” for Shields
means understanding technologies as “purposive instrumentalities whose
relevant explanatory properties may be described exhaustively within a
framework of means-ends rationality” (Shields , ). Because of this
“instrumentalist” perspective, which positions technology in a sphere of ra-
tional, pre-social phenomena, classical sociology tends to ignore technology.
Weber’s disdain of means-ends rationality as the “degree zero” of social ac-
tion, no less than Pareto’s distinction between logical and non-logical action,
has encouraged sociologists to cede technology to the sphere of science and
economics. Marx, of course, also saw technology as primarily a product of
economic calculation, as machines whose forms were shaped by the exploita-
tive ambitions of competing capitalists. Ironically, Shields argues that even
the new technology studies – however salutary their redefinition of technolo-
gy as an inherently sociological phenomenon – do not escape this instru-
mentalist horizon. Even here, technologies are seen as products of instru-
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mental design, of efforts to produce specific use-values for specific social
groups.
According to Shields, the way out of the instrumentalist trap is to look at
technologies in use.The social meaning of a technology is not what its design-
ers claim it to be,but in what users make of it.Shields formulates this as a prin-
ciple of “instrumental underdetermination”, as a failure of instrumentalist
intentionality to exhaust the social meaning of a technology. Shields, in fact,
seems to be arguing that the sociology of technology only properly begins at
the point where users take over from designers to integrate artifacts into what
he calls “sociotechnical practices”. “Technological artifacts are thus poly-
semic, because different agents – inventors, designers and users – employ
schemas, or ‘frames of meaning’ ... that render artifacts ‘capable of being in-
terpreted in varying ways’”. A variety of agents, working with different per-
spectives, constitute “sociotechnical practices” around specific artifacts or
technological systems and provide the proper subject matter for the sociolo-
gy of technology.
Quite aside from the question of whether Shields’ characterisation of new
technology studies as essentially instrumentalist is apposite – which I think it
is not – the overall point is well taken. Clearly, when we focus on technolo-
gies-in-use instead of only on technologies-as-instrument (as material
means for attaining specific ends), we uncover a rich sociological and anthro-
pological dimension to technology which, moreover, can be approached with
traditional theories and methods. On this view, technologies are not some
non-social bit of logical action, but become societal constructs, just like laws,
religions, norms and the other furnishings of classical sociological theory.
Technologies, in this sense, become sociological objects in an immanent and
transparent way and are no longer sociologically inexplicable intrusions into
the social from some other realm.
However, Shields’s rejection of “instrumentalism” throws out the baby
with the bathwater. There is a difference between asserting that technology is
only an instrument, and asserting that it is that, but also many other things as
well. I think Shields fails to make this distinction and in a shortcut effort to re-
define technology as sociologically “just folks” wrongly quarantines the in-
strumentality, which makes technology such a unique and pervasive socio-
logical phenomenon. The g- coil story – which, in spite of its exotic context,
seems to me on this point perfectly generalizable to all kinds of other tech-
nologies – makes quite clear that artifacts are designed as “purposive instru-
mentalities”. In design, as Bucciarelli (), Henderson () and Vincenti
() make plain, artifacts-in-becoming are, as Shields puts it: “described
exhaustively within a framework of means-ends rationality”. That is indeed
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the business and logic of design. The question then is: what is the relation of
design as a specific subset of societal practices to the ultimate working of arti-
facts in society?
It is true, as Shields argues, that design suffers from “instrumental under-
determination”. Its instrumentalist horizons do not indeed exhaust the possi-
bilities of artifacts-in-use. However, “instrumental underdetermination” is
not an argument for the irrelevance of design, nor for the irrelevance of a so-
ciology of design. It is only a powerful argument for also including actual “so-
ciotechnical practices”in our perusal of technologies.
Although there is unquestionably some slippage between designed arti-
facts and used artifacts, this is certainly a question of degree and differs ac-
cording to the type of artifact. While a knife may be designed as a weapon, it
can also cut bread. The Palm Organizer, designed as an electronic appoint-
ment book with note-taking facilities, has been seized upon by users and pro-
grammers and endowed with a plethora of non-intended uses and identities.
The g- coils, on the other hand, are such complex and dedicated pieces of
equipment it is hard to imagine another use which exploits their essential de-
sign features than the one for which they were in fact designed. It is also not
easy to imagine that the ultimate users will develop significantly different op-
erational protocols from those developed in the design phase. This suggests
two untested and speculative first approximations about the relationship be-
tween design intentions and ultimate use: First, the complexity of an artifact
is something like inversely proportional to its flexibility-in-use. Second, the
more context-bound an artifact, the less likely actual use will deviate from the
use envisioned by designers. These propositions want testing, but even in this
tentative form they suggest that care should be taken in divorcing uses (and
effects) observed in practice from uses previously envisioned in design.
In general, a principle of “limited flexibility” seems apposite, stating that
the way artifacts are designed is more or less consequential for the way they
will ultimately be used. Products may in fact be specifically designed with
what might be called a “topography of use”, i.e., gradients encouraging and
discouraging particular uses. Users can sometimes get around such design
topographies, but if the designers are on the ball, only at costs which may in
fact be disheartening.
Having the post-modernist cake
Fran Collyer () is not so worried about “instrumentalist” biases in tech-
nology studies. Nor does she advocate a new focus on technology-in-use as a
remedy. At another level, however, she shares Shields’s concerns of how to
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merge “post-modernist” theories of innovation associated with authors like
Callon, Pinch, Bijker, Latour, and Hughes, with more generic social theory.As
she puts it:
Although post-modern perspectives have correctly identified the emer-
gence of a greater diversity in social relations and broken down the dis-
tinction between subject and object, post-modernism is too often con-
sidered in terms of a total replacement for structuralist sociology. In its
stead, it is suggested that the insights of post-modernist theory be added
to the sociological ‘armory’. Such a merger would allow a better integra-
tion of theories of technology and society. This would produce a more
adequate theory of invention and help to explain how social inequalities
shape the invention process. (Collyer , )
To achieve this merger, it is essential that post-modern theory abandon its
posture of splendid isolation. Moreover, it contains a number of flaws which
must be remedied before it can be “added to the sociological ‘armory’”.
Collyer seizes upon Callon’s “translation networks” as the paradigm to be
criticised (Callon ). The first problem is that the model“offers insufficient
explanations for the relationship between the actants or the differing capaci-
ties of the actants to direct and control the invention process.... the actions of
some actants (such as an individual or group) are both quantitatively and
qualitatively different from the actions of other actants (such as a computer
or an amoeba)”(Collyer , -).
This lack of what we might call sociological relief of course inheres in the
notion of “actant”. The whole point of the concept is to denote a relative or
momentary “phase state” of an entity: that which in a given situation is initi-
ating a transfer of“intermediaries”(instead of itself being transferred).So the
notion of “actant”has no essentialist connotations. It is only a role in the net-
work dynamics which every entity (human or non-sentient) can at times
play.We have seen in the case of S.E. Fireworks that the explosives were trans-
formed from intermediaries into very forceful actants, and in the case of the
 Mathematical Tables Project that the human calculators, agents all, were
reduced to “mere” intermediaries. However, from a traditional sociological
perspective this structuralist focus on network dynamics at the expense of
ontological veracity is, as I argued above, immensely unsettling, and Collyer’s
criticism here is directed at just that point.
From the point of view of an adequate sociology, it would be desirable to
have some indication of the relative chances of different kinds of entities
(e.g., humans or non-sentients) of becoming either actants or intermedi-
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aries. We would also want to know how different types of entities change
phase, i.e., change from actant to intermediary and vice versa. What types of
processes involving what types of other entities typically induce this transfor-
mation for different kinds of entities? In the context of the S.E. Fireworks sto-
ry, for example, I argued for a distinction between natural and human causal-
ity. Finally, what types of entities tend to be dominant in translation net-
works? Sociology has developed a vast conceptual arsenal for dealing with
power relations and “life chances” among networked human actors; is any-
thing like this possible when non-human or non-sentient actants get in-
volved? Is there, to echo Marx, anything determinate in the final instance? Do
the oysters, or do the walrus and the carpenter, typically carry the day? Or can
we, like the carpenter, take stock only after the oysters have been eaten up?
Collyer also takes translation network theory to task on another count.She
criticises it for what we might call its solipsism, i.e., its tendency to discount
an external world.The focus is on the internal process.External “factors”, lim-
its and opportunities are simply not taken into account. Collyer says: “Theo-
retical disregard for the consequences of social structure means that the
model over-estimates the capacity of scientists and others within the network
to shape their own circumstances just as it under-estimates the impact of so-
cietal processes beyond the immediate activity of the actors” (Collyer ,
).
This is a sociologically unexceptionable criticism. However, it does not ab-
solve us from defining just what we mean by this “social structure” and ex-
plaining how it impinges on the ongoing structuration of the translation net-
work under consideration. If the narrative strategy of Latour’s Aramis is any
clue, then the network approach solves the problem simply by subsuming all
elements that have some bearing on the unfolding plot of the translation net-
work into the network itself (Latour e). Hence, there literally is no exter-
nal “social structure” or, rather, elements of that putative “social structure”
are absorbed into the network as needed (both by the actants and the ana-
lysts). The network simply expands to cover the relevant turf. However, such
rampant contingency literally robs us of a coherent vision of the social world
and obviates the possibility of prediction and the hope for societal manage-
ment of technological development.
But then, what is “social structure”? In one sense, it is only a bookkeeping
ploy to distinguish what is transient and of immanent pragmatic or analytical
interest from that which is more stable and lasting – and which is taken for
granted as a background of available “rules and resources” (Giddens ) by
both actors and analysts. And, in a historical sense, structure is a residue of
agency. Factors, institutions and positions are built up over time and can per-
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sist thanks to the benefits they produce for the few or the many. These struc-
tures define cost-benefit gradients for different types of actor-strategies and
thus shape dynamic social processes.
New rules for a sociology of technology
What clearly has to be done if the “merger” between “post-modern” theories
of technology and sociology is to have a chance to align these two discourses
in some way. Werner Rammert (), our final ridge-rider, has made just
such an effort in the form of a new set of “New Rules of Sociological Method”.
Rammert’s twelve rules, a double-take on Anthony Giddens’s ()take
on Durkheim, are an attempt to define a general sociology capable of incor-
porating technology as a “social fact”. Rammert’s specific aim is to combine “a
constructivist explanation of technology generation on the local level ... with
a social evolutionary approach of structural selection on the global level”
(Rammert , ). Like Collyer, Rammert criticises the new technology
studies for their inability to comprehend large-scale structural processes. He
shares Giddens’s view that a rational sociology must “chart a course between
interactionism and structuralism” (Rammert , ) and so he seeks to
complement the “interactionism”of  (Bijker and Pinch ) and actor-
network theory with a “structuralist” mode of analysis. Rammert begins by
defining what he sees as the essential sociological nature of artifacts. His first
three rules reconfirm basic conclusions we drew from our technology para-
bles, particularly the dual agent/structure nature of artifacts and the impor-
tance of design in establishing artifact properties and societal effects.
Rules  through  address possibilities for a sociological account of tech-
nology development. We are up a notch from the design floor. The argument
turns on the concept of “technology projects”. These are concerted efforts to
combine inquiry into the unknown with routine resources in order to pro-
duce “an artificial and reliable technical system”(Rammert , ). The el-
ements of such a “technical system”can be “physical effects, material artifacts,
sign codes and habitualised routines”. But note, not human bodies. Technical
projects are theatres of social conflict and co-operation; a plethora of hetero-
geneous actors with different resources and following different rules do battle
in order to project their own notions of order and utility onto the project in
becoming.
Rules  and  take us a step further on the ladder of socio-technical aggre-
gation. Rule  suggests ways of conceptually bridging the gap between local
and idiosyncratic technological projects and the various “institutional fields”
of society. If local projects aim at the constitution of a successful techno-
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structure (the context within which artifacts become operative), then this can
only be achieved on the basis of “micro-politics of negotiation”between local
actors and the macro-social networks. Rammert distinguishes four “fields”:
the scientific, the technological, the political and the economic. Science is
about whether proposed operating principles are feasible. Technology is
about defining standard procedures and acceptable interpretations of the
“state of the art”. Politics is about the ideological and political resonance of
projects. Which particular variants will politicians back, and what are the le-
gal and funding consequences? Economics is about techno-structures in the
context of innovation within firms.
Rules  and  represent an effort to tie the level of concrete local projects,
as incremental additions to the stock of technology, to the overall dynamic
of technology at a global level. Rammert argues that on a global level the
structuration process should be treated as “blind variation” because techno-
projects are blind to long-term effects and have all kinds of “unintended
consequences”anyway.Local activities of enrollment and translation in actor-
networks are not undertaken with an eye to overall outcomes. They could not
do so even if they would, because of the various “structural filters” – con-
ceived as institutionalised patterns of constraints and enablements – im-
posed by the different fields through which technology projects must navi-
gate.“... the operating filters are manifold, their effects cannot be precisely cal-
culated, and ... they are developing simultaneously”(Rammert , ).
Rule  summarises Rammert’s approach: “Technical change neither re-
sults from a structural logic of development that operates beyond the scope
of social actors, as Durkheim’s first rule may suggest, nor is it entirely open to
voluntary action and various constructions of technology, as social construc-
tivism may suggest” (Rammert , ). This general argument positions
Rammert’s rules squarely within structuration theory. Sociologically salient
are all those mechanisms which encourage predictability and stability. As
Rammert restates rule : “Structural filters which are institutionalised in the
different fields of the innovations system reduce the principled contingency of
technical change to certain corridors of technical development. But they
maintain the status of stabilised technology only as long as social actors prac-
tically reproduce the techno-structures”(Rammert , ).
Rammert’s overall effort merges core concepts from actor-network theory
as articulated in the writings of Callon, Latour and Law, with Giddens’s gen-
eral theory of structuration. The keystone is the integration of different levels
of analysis within the framework of an overall local-global dynamic. The lo-
cal dynamics are contingent – as actor-network analyses keep stressing – even
though – as Rammert stresses – they take place in the context of global struc-
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tures of rules and resources, i.e., in the context of field-specific “institutional
filters”. So even with the contingent variety produced at local levels, there is
already steering of technological “trajectories” due to the impinging of more
or less stabilised institutional structures. In this way technology is from its in-
ception a “social fact”, i.e., a structure explainable by recourse to other “social
facts”. In the best traditions of structuration theory, Rammert argues that
these local projects culminate in new techno-structures which subsequently
become part of the institutional order defining and shaping new technologi-
cal projects. Levels of analysis are joined in the transitions between rules 
and ,  and , and  and .
Having the cake and eating it
This said, our modest technology stories, no less than Shields’s and Collyer’s
texts, justify taking a second look at Rammert’s solution. While his fine-
grained proposal for joining classical sociology to the new technology studies
seems a direct answer to Collyer’s plea and is framed in the agency-structure
dialectic suggested by our stories, there are still some worrisome points. In
spite of Rammert’s openness to “post-modern” technology studies, he does
not offer quite the kind of solution Collyer seems to have in mind. Rammert
gives a wide berth to just those “post-modern” elements of new technology
studies that Collyer finds most intriguing. Likewise, Rammert’s text is a red
flag from the perspective of Shields’s diatribe against “instrumentalism”, de-
spite Rammert’s explicit rejection of an “instrumentalist”approach in favour
of a “pragmatic”one (rule ). Rammert’s overall approach to technology is to
view it as a societal problem-solving strategy centred on the design of arti-
facts. In so doing, he pays little attention to artifacts-in-use, although his
framework does provide the necessary conceptual space. Insofar as use or
users figure in Rammert’s sociology of technology, it is all about representa-
tions by designers of such use: i.e., the “configured user” rather than the em-
pirical patterns of use themselves.
Our technology stories concur in identifying these as serious gaps. A com-
petent sociology of technology must encompass both the design of technolo-
gies and their societal implementation, or “use”. Rammert’s neglect of the lat-
ter aspect makes it easier for him to merge technology studies into traditional
sociology. By concentrating on design, rather than use, Rammert can avoid
the debate about the agency of nonhumans. Design is about the structuration
of artifacts, i.e., about conceiving and building “techno-structures”, a process
in which artifacts are object, rather than subject, of agency. As Collyer sug-
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gests, the doctrine of nonhuman agency is the most radical attack possible on
sociology as a modernist project. Rammert’s focus avoids messing with tradi-
tional sociological ontologies; this is apparently the price he thinks he must
pay to remain sociologically credible. In point of fact, he explicitly distances
himself from what he calls “some exaggerations” of the actor-network posi-
tion for their refusal to distinguish between “reflexive human agents and
non-reflexive non-human agents”(Rammert , ).
So Rammert still leaves us with two knotty issues: how to sociologise tech-
nologies-in-use and how to conceptualise the agency of artifacts.On the basis
of what has been said above, it should be possible in principle to distinguish a
sociology of technology-in-use from a sociology of technology-in-design, al-
though rarely will we be able to distinguish these as separate phases in prac-
tice.Our stories attest that all kinds of ironic and unintended effects can erupt
when once-designed technologies are put to use, some of which will be quite
oblique to the interests which framed the original design of the techno-struc-
ture itself. As noted, artifacts may have certain use-gradients “designed into”
them, but they are far from impervious to redefinition, “misuse”, or cata-
strophic failure when put to work in context (Fleck ).
As Shields argues, the “context of use” should not be seen merely as a
sphere in which the artifact “ripens” as a “techno-structure”, i.e., in which the
potentials of the artifact are revealed in practice. It is at the same time a sphere
in which the techno-structure reveals the potentialities it has for restructur-
ing the societal context into which it has been introduced. The point is that
the social context of use is modified or “evolves” in the very same process in
which the artifact itself is modified and in which it evolves in new directions.
This is part of the meaning of the “co-evolution” of technology and society.
S.E. Fireworks was a dramatic example, but the Palm organizer and its fellow
travellers will no doubt be more consequential in the long run.A sociology of
technology-in-use would do well to follow Rammert’s and Fleck’s lead in dis-
tinguishing local, contingent contexts of use from more global structural and
institutional contexts.
To my mind, there is little in Rammert’s text to suggest that he would dis-
agree with any of these points. The problem seems rather a matter of empha-
sis than the willful and thematic suppression of technology-in-use. Ram-
mert’s focus is on technology dynamics, the fountainhead and until recently
the working face of new technology studies. Hence he elaborates on how cri-
teria for new technology are established and on how resources for constitut-
ing new technologies are assembled, rather than on the effects artifacts and
technological systems have on societal order, as modifications of agency and
as new elements in the structural landscape. However, nothing suggests that
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Rammert is principally insensitive to these issues, and more importantly,
there is nothing in his proposal that would militate against including tech-
nologies-in-use as an integral “phase” in the technological dialectic he pro-
poses. A similar local-global logic would be apposite here, with locally con-
textualised usages generating varieties of experience and critique which
would be differentially institutionalised depending on their resonance with
different “institutional filters”. The use of technologies and the transforma-
tions of agency and structure which that entails could be seen as a form of in-
formal societal innovation subject to the same kinds of dynamics as the more
formal innovation in institutionalised design settings Rammert now seems
to be focussing on.
The agency of nonhumans is more difficult to incorporate into Rammert’s
new synthesis. He himself seems adamant in reserving agency to human per-
sons, coupling agency irrevocably to “reflexivity”. This is of course the classi-
cal sociological prohibition, and the question is just how forbidding is it?
Does it in the end prevent us from realising Collyer’s project of integrating
classical sociology and “post-modern”technology studies? 
I have already suggested that introducing nonhuman entities and hetero-
geneous types of agency does not compromise the dialectic of agency and
structure as a sociological mode of reasoning and explanation. That is to say,
deviant (in casu nonhuman) forms of agency do not compromise the dialec-
tical core of classical sociology.What is compromised,however, is the classical
logic of attribution, of explanation of actor behaviour as canonised in Max
Weber’s famous dictum of Verstehen. Without such possibilities for attribu-
tion, sociology is at sea; actors must be invested with valences,preferences, in-
terests, etc. in order for their behaviour to be sociologically comprehensible,
i.e., to be soziales Handeln in Weber’s sense. Or must they?
In point of fact, it is my impression – though I can hardly prove it in the
scope of this chapter – that sociology really has no deep or consistent defini-
tion of the homo sociologicus. From sociology’s inception, the inner work-
ings of human actors, by all accounts the constitutive elements of social or-
der, have been black-boxed in order to throw up ramparts against the seduc-
tions of reductionism. Sociology’s project is in a sense to deny human agency
a reality sui generis. To put it very crudely: society is all; individuals are noth-
ing. It is true that some th-century American strains of sociology like sym-
bolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, or Erving Goffman’s “dramaturgy”
have made an effort to flesh out a concept of human action, underscoring its
creative, dramaturgical and interpretative features. These interpretative tra-
ditions define human actors as the makers and sustainers of social order and
devote much attention to describing how local settings are produced by the
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ongoing creative agency of human participants. But this is a “little tradition”
in the sociological project, in its approach and marginality analogous to so-
cial constructivist theories of technology. Like the latter (as Rammert rightly
argues), there is a big gap between explanations stressing creative agency and
local contingency and those aiming at the clarification of global structures as
constraints on and resources for local agency. In this “big tradition”, human
agency is consistently schematised. Humans are treated more or less either as
mechanical input-output devices (rational action theory), as bearers of sets
of interests (class or otherwise) and “value dispositions”, or as complex self-
constituting monads whose perceptions and motives in any given situation
must be intuited by the analyst (i.e., Verstehen). All of these approaches im-
pute arbitary dispositions to actors, making them available as narcissistic al-
ter-egos of the sociologist. Hence, the rejection of nonhuman agency by clas-
sical sociology (and by Rammert in its wake) does not appear to be justified
by the wish to preserve a deep and rich theory of human agency, but rather by
its opposite, the fear of having to provide such a theory.
In a way this is an opportunity, rather than a liability. Pace Herman Hesse,
we do not have to begin by first destroying a world. However, in order to ex-
ploit the opportunity, we have to avoid a certain idée fixe which has paralysed
debates about admissible forms of agency. This is the notion that we have to
define nonhuman agency as a sociological category. If our technology stories
show anything at all about agency in a material world, it is that it is never ei-
ther purely human or purely nonhuman, but intrinsically heterogeneous and
hybrid.Agency is not, to be somewhat precipitous, rooted in the properties of
entities-in-themselves, but rather in the properties of entities as elements of
networks (or structures). And those networks/structures are invariably con-
catenations of both human and nonhuman actors.
The idea of the actor-network encourages us to think in terms of distrib-
uted agency rather than the agency of discrete entities. In the S.E. Fireworks
story, the bunkers and the explosives certainly acted, but they did not act
alone, nor did they do so in isolation from human actors. The entire “hybrid
collectif”of S.E. Fireworks is the agent of destruction here, not one or anoth-
er human manager, operative or technical component. Arie Rip happens to
live close to the site of the explosion. The concrete projectile which impacted
in his back yard and pulverised several bricks there is no doubt an actor in re-
spect to the previous structure of that bit of his back yard. However, it only
became the actor it did by virtue of its former place in the hybrid socio-tech-
nical actor-network of S.E. Fireworks: a network, as it turned out, that con-
sisted of an explosive mixture of unreliable humans and unreliable nonhu-
mans implicated in complex agency-structure dynamics, i.e., in complex
chains of mutual translation.
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It is the dynamics of such concatenations, i.e., Callon and Law’s “hybrid
collectifs”, that have to be incorporated into the socio-logics of agency and
structure, rather than nonhuman agency per se. This is of course a metaphysi-
cally daunting task, inasmuch as heterogeneous chains of agency and causali-
ty are implicated. It is a task that Rammert has neither attempted nor even de-
fined as worthwhile – and I would say to the detriment of his otherwise ad-
mirable project. There are, however, promising leads. Marx’s analysis of the
machine is certainly one of them (MacKenzie ), with the tradition of
labour-process theory in its wake (Noble , Kern and Schuman ).
More recently, Perrow’s already cited work on “normal accidents” has given
us fine-grained accounts of the behaviour of risk-ridden “hybrid collectifs”
which could be extended to less accident-prone organisations and networks.
Of course, actor-network theory has been the programmatic guiding light in
regard to mixing metaphors (and actants). However, it is flawed by its prefer-
ence for metaphysics in favour of history (i.e., sedimented structure) and by
its polemical advocacy of the identity – rather than the sociological equiva-
lence – of human and nonhuman agency. What we now need is an extension
of Rammert’s project which retains his commitment to the socio-logic of
agency and structure, but which also incorporates the mixed ontology of the
“hybrid collectif ”.
Notes
 For an example of this mutual estrangement, see the recent exchange between
Bruno Latour (c) and David Bloor (a, b).
 www.palm.com 
 g- coil-group minutes. February , .
 g- notes , minutes March , , joint meeting.
 g- notes , coil group meeting June , .
 Analysts from the actor-network school would assent to the tenor of this picture,
although they would refer to processes of “stabilisation”and “irreversabilisation”
rather than speak of a substantive structure or organisation.They would also, un-
like sociologists, grant nonhumans their proper due in the actor-network.
 Actor-network theory, set up as a technologically sensitive theoretical rival to so-
ciology, also replicates this sociology of levels (Elias )using concepts like
“point-representation”and “macro-actor”(Callon and Latour ).
 A major exception must be made for the tradition launched by Charles Perrow to
which I will return below. See Perrow () and Vaughan ().
 In fact, in , several new experiments were proposed (and will presumably be
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carried out) which utilise the generic capacity of the detector as a storage ring for
muons. So even in this dedicated design there appears to be enough ambiguity to
allow for different socio-technical practices-in-use.
 See Boudon () for an agonistic example of the struggle to define – and not to
define – who or what the sociological actor is. The struggle is instructive because
it is an explicit attempt to define the “rational kernel”of sociology on the basis of
the synthesis of classical texts.
 This position has a certain affinity with Barry Barnes’s recent critique of the indi-
vidualist bias in social theory (Barnes ), but with a difference. Barnes argues
that the classical sociological tradition, including synthetic reformist theories like
those of Talcott Parsons and Anthony Giddens, has been blighted by an undue
stress on individualistic agency. This would seem to indicate for sociology an
elaborated theory of human individuality, which ironically is lacking. Barnes
concludes that the emphasis on human agency in recent social theory is a reaction
to determinist sociologies.Agency boils down to the use of individual rationality
to resist “irrational”societal “constraints”. Human agents can be free because in
the final analysis they are nobody’s fool. Barnes argues that this individualistic ap-
proach, enshrined in Rational Action Theory, is misguided and that instead we
should look for another kind of “collective agency”rooted in the essential sociali-
ty of human beings:“…the characteristic accomplishments of human beings are
precisely the products of their lack of independence as responsible agents. Their
cultures, institutions and forms of life; their inventions and innovations; their
ability to generate and direct awesome concentrations of power; are all the result
of their collective agency, which derives in turn from the the mutual susceptibility
linked to their concern with face and status”(Barnes , ).
My argument that agency should not be situated in the properties of entities-in-
themselves but in the networks they constitute with each other certainly resonates
with this position in a formal sense, but I can see no self-evident way to map
Barnes’s conception of “mutual susceptibility”among humans onto the kinds of
relationships prevailing between humans and nonhuman entities – let alone
those among nonhuman entities themselves. If we succeed in theorising the
agency of the “hybrid collectif ”in a Barnesian vein, it will have to be by grafting
the radically different logic of “natural law”(and its articulation with human
agency) onto his humanist conception of mutual susceptibility “linked to con-
cern with face and status”. This would at the very least entail re-emphasising hu-
man rationality (as the capacity to understand and exploit behaviours subject to
“natural law”) as the basis of hybrid agency.As far as I can see, something like this
would be the only route to incorporating nonhumans into Barnes’s charmed cir-
cle of “collective agency”.
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